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Whisenhunt also argued Lakeview Drive was a rural highway, one
not dedicated to the public. The court disagreed and concluded that
the roadway had been dedicated to the public and the placement of
water lines beneath the roadway was consistent with the public's use of
roadway. Thus, the court held the chancellor's decision to dissolve the
preliminary injunction and dismiss Whisenhunt's complaint was not
clearly erroneous.
Willow Morrow
CALIFORNIA
Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr.
2d 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding harmless error standard
inapplicable to statutory review under California Environmental
Quality Act so that either an improper designation of lead agency or
an insufficient environmental impact review constitutes reversible
error).
California's Department of Water Resources ("DWR") built and
operated the complex system of facilities that comprise the State Water
Project ("SWP"). As originally conceived, the SWP was to deliver 4.23
million acre-feet of water annually. Accordingly, DWR entered into
contracts with twenty-nine agricultural and urban water suppliers in
which the suppliers received entitlements to a certain amount of the
4.23 million acre-feet in return for payment of a proportionate share
of the financing and maintenance of SWP facilities. Article 18 of the
contracts provided for reallocation in times of shortage. The first
provision, 18(a), allowed DWR to reduce delivery of water to
agricultural suppliers only in times of temporary shortage. The second
provision, 18(b), allowed DWR to reduce all suppliers' entitlements
proportionately in the face of permanent shortage.
As eventually built, the SWP delivered approximately 2.5 million
acre-feet annually. This fact, coupled with the recent seven-year
drought, led the urban and agricultural suppliers to dispute DWR's
implementation of Article 18. As a result, DWR and six suppliers
negotiated the Monterey Agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement
proposed revisions to all supplier contracts, with DWR assuming
primary responsibility for convincing the other suppliers to enter the
Agreement. The Agreement called for DWR to transfer control of a
particular property to agricultural suppliers and to provide for
permanent sales of water among suppliers. The Agreement also
provided for the Central Coast Water Agency ("CCWA") to serve as
lead agency under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA")
in preparing the environmental impact review ("EIR").
In a reverse validation proceeding, two citizens groups and a public
agency (collectively, the "League") challenged the selection of CCWA
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as lead agency, the sufficiency of the EIR it prepared, and the ability of
the DWR to alienate SWP property. The trial court found that
although it was improper for CCWA to serve as lead agency, this error
did not harm the sufficiency of the EIR. The trial court dismissed the
League's final contention for failure to serve indispensable parties.
The League appealed and defendants DWR and CCWA (collectively
"DWR") cross-appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Third
Appellate Division.
In agreeing CCWA was not lead agency, the court analyzed the
statutory definition of lead agency under CEQA. A lead agency is the
public agency with primary responsibility for carrying out or approving
a project that may have significant environmental effects. Here, the
project involved the SWP contract revisions embodied in the
Agreement. Because DWR was the only agency responsible for
negotiating and executing the revised SWP contracts with suppliers, it
was the lead agency. As a party to the SWP contracts, CCWA merely
held a stake in the success of the negotiations with other suppliers, but
had no direct responsibility for the outcome. In addition, only DWR
represented statewide perspective and expertise. Because CEQA does
not allow a lead agency to delegate its duties, only DWR could have
served as lead agency. Established state law indicates failure to appoint
the proper lead agency, in itself, requires reversal.
In addition, the court found the EIR insufficient to inform the
public because it did not adequately describe existing conditions or
offer plausible visions of the foreseeable future, as required by the
CEQA "no project alternative." CEQA requires that the no project
alternative be a thorough and straightforward analysis of the
environmental consequences of failing to implement the project.
Here, the Agreement called for the elimination of Article 18(b) in the
new contracts, but the EIR did not address the possible impacts of this
permanent shortage provision. Because DWR believed Article 18(b)
had never been nor would ever be utilized, they felt it unnecessary to
discuss its omission from the project. The League argued DWR had
been operating under the provisions of Article 18(b) ever since it
became apparent that the SWP could never deliver 4.23 million acrefeet per year. Finding the League's argument plausible, the court held
the EIR failed the statutory no project alternative requirement by
omitting discussion of the environmental consequences of Article
18(b).
The court also found the EIR's alternative analysis deficient.
CEQA demands an objective, evaluative analysis of the feasibility of
project alternatives. One main goal of the project involved removing
the contractual disparity between the SWP's actual yield and its
original intended yield. Because the SWP could not physically deliver
each supplier's full entitlement, the contracts contained substantial
paper water rights. Paper water rights stem from the difference
between the amount of water a user is entitled to and the amount the
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user actually receives. A paper water right is so named because, as
here, when there is not enough water to fulfill the entitlement, the
right exists only on paper. In addressing this problem, the court
found the EIR did not view Article 18(b) as a feasible alternative and
instead summarily dismissed it as infeasible. The EIR failed to
meaningfully analyze the permanent proportionate decrease
provisions of Article 18(b) to reflect SWP's actual yield as a project
alternative.
On the whole, the court found the EIR's analysis defective because
it did not sufficiently provide the public with a base line against which
to measure the project, the status quo, and the alternatives. In
reversing the trial court, the court held harmless error review
inapplicable to a court evaluating the statutory mandates of CEQA.
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the EIR was sufficient even
though the agency drafting it was not the proper lead agency
constituted reversible error. The court also reversed the trial court's
dismissal for failure to serve indispensable parties because the reverse
validation proceeding was an in rem action whose only indispensable
party consisted of the public agency owning the res.
Susan P. Klopman
San Luis Coastal Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Morro Bay, 97 Cal. Rptr.
2d 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding section 1810 of the California
"Wheeling Statutes" did include as a transferor entitled to use a city's
water conveyance facility's unused capacity, a school district
purchasing less expensive water from the county).
The San Luis Unified School District ("School District") appealed
the trial court'sjudgment denying a writ of mandate against the City of
Morro Bay ("City"). The writ would compel the City to allow the
School District to use the excess capacity of the City's water
conveyance facility to transfer water purchased by the School District
from San Luis County ("County") to schools within the City. Section
1810 of the California Water Code required public agencies to allow
bona fide transferors to use excess unused capacity in their water
conveyance facility in return for fair compensation. The School
District argued it was a "bona fide transferor" within the meaning of
section 1810.
The trial court ruled the School District was not included within
the definition of a "transferor" because a "transferor" was limited to
those who contracted for the sale of water. The trial court agreed with
the City that the School District had a contract to purchase water, not
a contract for the sale of water. Therefore, the School District was not
a transferor entitled to use the City's water conveyance system.
The court of appeals reversed. First, the court ruled the School
District was a transferor within the statute. The court stated a contract

